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With the certainty of global warming, the term “climate refugees” 
is gaining popularity in public discourse. There seems to be some 
fear in the developed countries that they, if not flooded liter-
ally, will most certainly be flooded by ”climate refugees”. From 
a forced migration perspective, the term is flawed for several 
reasons. 
The term “climate refugees” implies a mono-causality that one 
rarely finds in human reality. No one factor, event or process, 
inevitably results in forced migration or conflict. It is very likely 
that climate change impacts will contribute to an increase in 
forced migration. Because one cannot completely isolate climate 
change as a cause however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
stipulate any numbers. Importantly, the impacts depend not only 
on natural exposure, but also on the vulnerability and resilience of 
the areas and people, including capacities to adapt. At best, we 
have “guesstimates” about the possible form and scope of forced 
migration related to climate change.
Climate change will have several impacts on the environment 
which in turn can impact on forced migration and conflict. 
Gradual environmental degradation and slow-onset disasters 
such as drought are likely to increase due to climate change. 
Most vulnerable are developing countries where large sections of 
the population live directly from agriculture and many of these 
from subsistence farming. Importantly, adaptation, involving for 
example different land-use techniques and livelihood diversi-
fication, would lessen the need to migrate. Climate change is 
also likely to lead to an increase in the frequency and severity of 
sudden disasters such as floods and storms. Many of the affected 
are particularly vulnerable (typically poor) people in develop-
ing countries. Hence, they have little mobility. Climate change 
impacts can impoverish them and reduce their mobility even 
further. As is the case with drought, sudden disaster impact de-
pends on several political and socio-economic factors, including 
adaptation measures (for example flood defence infrastructure). 
Forced migration is also likely to result from rising sea levels, and 
certain low-lying island states may disappear altogether, raising 
difficult questions of statelessness. 
Forced migration can be triggered by – and itself also trigger – 
environmental conflicts. In transit or at the place of destination, 
migration can (be perceived to and/or) contribute to a competi-
tion for already scarce resources such as land and water. Most 
conflicts with an environmental element have historically oc-
curred within countries. The degradation of freshwater resources 
can trigger competition and conflict. Sudden disasters such as 
storms and floods often highlight existing domestic problems, 
revealing weaknesses of the government in power and may 
thereby exacerbate conflict. Conflict potential normally depends 
on a range of socio-economic and political factors often similar 
to those that can trigger forced migration. Governance and the 
role of the state are often crucial factors. In fact, cooperation 
rather than conflict may be the response to some environmental 
challenges.
It is likely that developing countries in lower latitudes will con-
tinue in the near future to be the hotspots in several senses of the 
word. Faced with climate change, there may be some increase 
in planned migration that is longer-distance, longer-term and 
more permanent. Increased urbanisation with the possibility 
of secondary migration can also be expected. But most of the 
forced migration and conflict related to climate change, is likely 
to remain internal and regional. While the developed countries 
bear the main responsibility for climate change, one could ques-
tion whether the dynamics of climate change, conflict and forced 
migration can and should be portrayed as a threat image of 
masses of refugees flooding over western borders. The sad truth 
is that there will be real floods, and if nothing changes, many of 
the affected will have little choice but to return and risk further 
flooding. 
From a legal point of view the term climate refugees is also inac-
curate. Some authors have suggested amending the 1951 Refugee 
Convention to accommodate for environmental displacement. 
Others suggest drafting a separate convention. Resorting to 
quick-fix solutions of new laws and policies often fulfils an action 
function, the need to be seen to act, but closer consideration of 
the existing prevention and protection possibilities may prove 
helpful before new measures are enacted.
In cases of severe environmental degradation and sudden disas-
ters, the human rights principle of non-refoulement could apply. 
When there is a risk of certain ill-treatment, people are protected 
against return. A need for international protection could be met 
by granting humanitarian asylum or another protected status.
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Many of the forced migrants are likely to be internally displaced. 
Disaster displacement is recognised in the 1998 Guiding Prin-
ciples on Internal Displacement. Those displaced due to more 
gradual environmental degradation could be considered dis-
placed due to slow-onset disasters, (the lack of) development or 
as a separate displaced category covered by the descriptive and 
non-exhaustive definition of the Guiding Principles. Many face 
challenges and have needs similar to conflict-induced displaced 
persons, but protection and assistance will largely depend on 
whether or not international organisations include them in their 
mandates. While there is often political will, money and media 
coverage when sudden disasters hit, those who move primarily 
due to gradual environmental degradation are often less visible. 
The degree of force in the migration may be considered different-
ly at the different stages of gradual environmental degradation. 
Particularly for this group, there may be operational and norma-
tive protection gaps, internally and internationally, because they 
risk being considered economic or voluntary migrants.
Existing law and protection possibilities should be further in-
vestigated to identify and address potential protection gaps. An 
approach similar to the one taken with regard to IDPs, with the 
creation of the Guiding Principles, could be considered. Many of 
the forced migrants may be included in already existing catego-
ries of protected persons, but they may need to be made more 
visible and recognised within the categories. For the internally 
displaced persons in general there is still a severe protection defi-
cit that must be better addressed. 
If it is better to prevent than to cure, one should also try to deal 
with the root causes of forced migration and conflict. Adaptation 
to climate change in developing countries must be made a top 
priority along with mitigation. Alongside more typical informa-
tion and infrastructure measures, addressing general factors of 
forced migration and conflict can contribute to vulnerability 
reduction and adaptation. A broad approach to climate change 
adaptation is needed. Hopefully, climate change will foster a 
new and stronger sense of solidarity. It provides an opportunity 
for cooperation in addressing global issues such as conflict and 
displacement.
Migration is one of the oldest coping strategies for dealing with 
environmental change. Throughout the millenniums people have 
moved temporarily or permanently during periods of drought 
and other environmental change. Lately, however, due to the 
perceived increase in the intensity and scale of environmental 
change, many people see environmentally induced forced migra-
tion as a new type of phenomenon. The fourth Assessment Re-
port of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)1 
authoritatively establishes that global warming is accelerating and 
that humans are directly responsible. The warming is unequivo-
cal and evident from observations of increases in global average 
air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, 
and rising sea level. Climate change is expected to have consider-
able impacts on the environment – first and foremost in develop-
ing countries. This, in turn, can trigger conflict and displacement 
of people.
“Climate refugees” are increasingly referred to in the debate on 
global climate change. However, the usage of the term seems 
unclear and at times misinformed. There is a paucity of informa-
tion about how climate change can trigger migration and what 
forms of migration one can expect. There is also much confusion 
about the conflict potential in climate change and forced migra-
tion. Finally, there is the question of how the migrants should be 
treated, particularly as to whether or not the label “refugee” is ap-
propriate. The objective of this report is to shed some light on the 
dynamics between climate change, conflict and forced migration. 
Furthermore, it will identify challenges and develop recommen-
dations, both to protect the displaced, and, indeed, to prevent 
forced migration related to climate change. Hopefully, this report 
will also contribute to bridging the disciplinary gap between 
environmentalists and natural scientists on the one hand, and 
migration and refugee specialists and lawyers on the other.
Warming up
The algae, the cloud and the human
In the early 1970s, James Lovelock and Lynn Margulys postulated a hypoth-
esis that has since evolved into what is today known as the Gaia theory: 
The Earth (Gaia is a mythological name for the Earth Goddess) is a self-
regulating system, in which life and its physical environment evolve as a 
single entity. Their holistic theory met with resistance in reductionist / iso-
lationist science circles, but has with the evidence of climate change become 
widely acknowledged. How everything is connected, can be illustrated by 
looking at the algae: Almost all ocean plants are algae. Through a process 
involving sunlight, they remove CO2 from the air and emit a sulphide gas. 
This gas oxidizes in the air to seed the droplets of clouds. Algae cannot 
flourish in surface waters above 10–12 °C. While the sun warms and lights 
up, the clouds help to cool the waters. Fossilized algae are the source of 
petroleum. The petroleum combustion of humans results in the emission 
of huge amounts of CO2 that trap heat and create global warming. Humans 
have now upset the natural self-regulation of Gaia, and Lovelock believes it 
is time for “sustainable retreat.” We will not be able to kill off Gaia, but Gaia 
will rid herself of parts of her that are too destructive – humans, unless we 
make peace with her. According to Lovelock’s predictions, large regions of 
the planet may become uninhabitable within a few decades, and human 
civilization itself could well collapse. (See Lovelock, J (2006), The Revenge 
of Gaia, London: Penguin Books.)
Climate and environment
While weather is the day-to-day state of the atmosphere, climate is the average state of weather over time and space. Mean temperature and the seasonal cycle 
in temperature over large areas are the clearest signals of change in the climate. Another important indicator is the amount and pattern of rain and snow. Some 
climate change is natural – that is, not caused by humans – and can be linked to processes on Earth such as volcanic eruptions or external forces such as variations 
in sunlight intensity. Today, however, the greenhouse gases emitted due to human activity (such as CO2 through fossil fuel combustion), are the main cause of 
global warming. 
The environment can be defined as the “totality of the surrounding conditions (WordNet, Princeton University).” Changes in climate can impact on the environ-
ment and vice versa. Altering the environment by for example deforestation, impacts on the climate because trees and plants cleanse the air of CO2. While floods 
are linked to climate factors such as temperature and rainfall, they do not occur independent of the general environment: human-made environmental change such 
as deforestation, add to the risk of for example floods. These so-called non-climate drivers include land use, land degradation, urbanisation and pollution. They 
affect the environment both directly and indirectly through the effect on the climate. In sum, societies change their environments, and thus may alter not only the 
climate but also their own vulnerability/resilience to climate change impacts.
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Different actors have used the term ”climate refugees” to refer to 
a broad range of situations. Today, it normally seems to imply a 
focus on climate change and its effects. The broader concept of 
environmental refugees has a longer history. In the mid-1980s, 
the issue of environmental refugees was addressed by the Inter-
national Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Essam El-
Hinnawi suggested a definition.2 The environmental researcher 
Norman Myers was prominent in popularising the term amongst 
high-profile officials such as former US President Bill Clinton 
and former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Natu-
rally this also facilitated its adoption by the media. A search on 
Google results in almost half a million listings on “environmental 
refugees”, and the term ”climate refugees” is quickly catching up.
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Examples of usage
The strong currency makes life even better under the sun for Norwegian climate 
refugees. 
(Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet on Norwegian senior citizens who choose 
to settle under the Spanish sun, 2002 (Author’s translation from Norwegian), 
http://www.dagbladet.no/dinside/2002/07/08/341679.html)
The first massive movement of climate refugees has been that of people away 
from the Gulf Coast of the United States.
(Earth Policy Institute in Washington describing the flight of hundreds of 
thousands from Hurricane Katharina in September 2006, 
http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2006/Update57_printable.htm)
If Norway is going to receive as many climate refugees as we create, we will have 
to open up for half a million in 2050.
(General Secretary, Norwegian Church Aid, at a security conference, Janu-
ary 2008 (Author’s translation from Norwegian), http://web3.aftenbladet.no/
lokalt/article574018.ece)
Definitions and typologies
Two of the most well known definitions of environmental refu-
gees are those of El-Hinnawi and Myers. 
Environmental refugees are:
• “people who have been forced to leave their traditional habi-
tat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked envi-
ronmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) 
that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the 
quality of their life. By ‘environmental disruption’ in this
definition is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological 
changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, 
temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human 
life.” (El-Hinnawi, 1985)3
• “persons who no longer gain a secure livelihood in their tra-
ditional homelands because of what are primarily environ-
mental factors of unusual scope.” (Myers and Kent, 1995)4
A fundamental difficulty in dealing with this topic, however, is 
that there is still no agreed definition and typology of environ-
mental refugees or migrants – and even less so in the case of the 
so-called ”climate refugees”. Some events or phenomena relating 
to the environment that may lead to migration and provide the 
basis for a typology, include the following:
1) Natural disasters / sudden disasters
2) Gradual environmental degradation / slow-onset disasters
3) Environmental conflicts
4) Environmental destruction as a consequence of or as a   
weapon in conflicts
5) Environment conservation
6) Development projects (such as dam construction)
7) Industrial accidents (such as Bhopal and Chernobyl)
There may be even further sub-categories based on distinctions 
such as: 
A. Human-made or natural change
B. Climate change-induced or all environmental 
change
C. Temporary or permanent environmental change
D. Temporary or permanent migration
E. Internal or international/cross-border migration
Of course, it matters little for the people affected if a disaster is 
related to human-induced climate change or not, but for some 
research and policy purposes this may be a useful distinction. 
In the following, this report concentrates on human-induced 
climate change and its consequences for forced migration and 
mainly addresses points 1, 2 and 3.
The game of name and numbers
According to a report published by the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council (IDMC), 
The “climate refugees”
9
Environmentally displaced persons and environmental migrants
The term “environmentally displaced persons” would contrary to “climate refugees” and “environmental refugees” not be dependent on location and could be used 
to describe those that are internally displaced as well as the refugees. 
“Environmentally displaced persons” has been defined as “persons who are displaced within their own country of habitual residence or who have crossed an inter-
national border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole 
one.” (Environmentally-Induced Population Displacements and Environmental Impacts Resulting from Mass Migration. International Symposium, Geneva, 21–24 
April 1996. International Organization of Migration (IOM)). 
While this term emphasizes the force element, IOM has suggested a broader working definition of “environmental migrants” as “persons or groups of persons who 
for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual 
homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.” (Opening statement of Brunson McKinley, 
Director General, IOM, Conference on Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration: Addressing Vulnerabilities and Harnessing Opportunities, 
Geneva, 19 February 2008).
there is no overarching organisation collecting or collating 
statistics on non-conflict displacement.5 Figures for the number 
of environmental refugees worldwide vary depending on the 
definition and the source of data. Some estimates are alarming. 
Norman Myers claims that there were already at least 25 million 
environmental refugees in the mid-1990s, and that we can expect 
50 million by 2010 and up to 150 million by 2050.6 Myers has 
been much cited, but his theories have also been criticized for 
being inconsistent, impossible to check and failing to take proper 
account of opportunities to adapt.7 To better understand this 
use of names and numbers, one can look closer at the different 
agendas and discourses.
The term “environmental refugees” may at first have served a hu-
manitarian agenda. It was introduced before internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) were recognised as a group with rights to protec-
tion and assistance. In the 1980s, the environment was high on 
the international political agenda and refugees were generally 
perceived as being innocent victims in need of help. Thereby, 
the term may have helped direct international attention to for 
example the drought-affected internally displaced in Sudan.8 
Today, the internally displaced are recognised as a group of forced 
migrants, and depoliticising the complex causes of crises such as 
famines is no longer considered necessary. 
Kibreab argues that the continued use of the term may relate to 
the agenda of those who wish to further restrict asylum laws and 
policies in the developed countries: Because “environmental” can 
imply a sphere outside politics, environmental refugees may be 
treated in much the same way as so-called economic migrants.9 
This speculation does not fit well with the fact that most litera-
ture on environmental or climate refugees today argues for an 
extension of international law, protection and assistance to cover 
this group. Although it may not be the intention of these authors, 
however, the use of the term can, nevertheless, have unfortunate 
side-effects: It may benefit actors trying to restrict asylum policies 
so long as there is not a public consensus to extend protection 
and assistance while there is increasingly a public misperception 
that many of those seeking asylum are so-called environmental 
migrants and not refugees entitled to protection by law.
Arguably, the prevalent use of the term today is linked to the 
agendas of environmentalists, conflict researchers and a het-
erogeneous group of security people. The estimated numbers 
of climate or environmental refugees are often used to sensitise 
public opinion and decision-makers to the issue of global warm-
ing. There seems to be some fear in the developed countries that 
they, if not literally flooded, will most certainly be flooded by 
the ”climate refugees”. With the end of the Cold War, attention 
shifted away from super-power rivalry, and the environment as 
a potential cause for conflict and forced migration has provided 
new material for conflict and security researchers. By “securitiz-
ing” the issue of climate change, environmentalists and others 
may have succeeded in getting it on the international agenda and 
into the minds of decision-makers. On the other hand, the secu-
rity discourse can serve to make new areas relevant for military
Future floods of refugees
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considerations and promote repressive tendencies. A funda-
mental critique is found in the context of north-south discourse 
where “environmental security” is seen as a colonisation of the 
environmental problems, suggesting that the underdeveloped 
south poses a physical threat to the prosperous north by popu-
lation explosions, resource scarcity, violent conflict and mass 
migration.10
The environment and security discourse may not see the problem 
entirely from the perspective of the so-called environmental or 
climate refugees themselves. The concept of environmental or cli-
mate refugees, including speculations on their numbers and the 
threat they pose, can be instrumentalised for purposes other than 
the protection of and assistance to the forced migrants. The term 
is most often used in plural, suggesting threat images of floods of 
refugees. The use of plural also indicates the challenges of iden-
tifying the individual climate or environmental refugee. Interest-
ingly, there is a divide within the literature between environmen-
tal and conflict researchers on the one hand, including Norman 
Myers and Thomas Homer-Dixon, and migration and protection 
specialists, prominently Richard Black, on the other. The main 
criticism from Black relates to both parts of the term environ-
mental refugee: “environmental” assumes that the migrants in 
question have moved as a direct consequence of environmental 
factors; “refugee” is legally inaccurate and suggests that the mi-
gration was forced and involved persecution and thereby a strong 
need for international protection.11 The same criticisms can apply 
in the case of ”climate refugees”, but the criticised assumption 
is then that climate change, with a somewhat narrower range of 
environmental factors, is the main cause of the migration. While 
looking closer at these criticisms in the context of climate change, 
this report aims to be a cross-disciplinary discussion in the sense 
that concepts and research from both migration and refugee 
studies as well as environmental (and climate) and conflict stud-
ies will be drawn upon. 
• One should be cautious when dealing with the estima-
tions of numbers of ”climate refugees” since there is 
not one common definition and the names and numbers 
are coloured by different discourses and agendas (such 
as the environmentalist, security, protection etc.)
Migration is normally considered a general term, covering all 
forms of movement taking place voluntarily or involuntarily 
and across or within national borders. In one sense we are all 
migrants of some sort, and place is a question of time. According 
to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), there are 
approximately 192 million international migrants today.12 More 
people are on the move now than at any other time in history. In 
order to better consider the validity of the assumption of force 
and causality between climate change and migration, one needs 
to look closer at factors influencing why people move.
Humans are not entities that can be understood easily within 
the natural science reductionist / isolationist cause-and-effect 
framework. Migrants should no more than others be reduced 
to and seen as mere passive victims. There is a myriad of factors 
in a person’s life that may motivate him or her to act in one way 
or another and the degree of force will vary. In a fundamental 
sense, there is perhaps always a choice of how to respond to the 
circumstances (for example one can always surrender to death), 
but the voluntary-forced dichotomy has been a commonly used 
distinction in migration studies and it also has legal implications. 
In reality this distinction will often be blurred, and describing 
force along a continuum may be more appropriate. 
Displacement usually describes a situation where people have 
been uprooted from their home by an external event or process 
that they have little or no control over.13 A form of displacement 
will often be part of the “forced” element of forced migration, 
while the “migration” element acknowledges the agency of forced 
migrants. In addition to debates about broadening the definition 
of displacement, there is also disagreement about when displace-
ment should be considered to have ended. According to UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, displacement is “arguably the 
most significant humanitarian challenge that we face.”14
There has always been a link between the climate and the envi-
ronment on the one hand and human migration on the other. 
Despite this history and the present media focus, the amount 
of research on these links by migration specialists is still rather 
limited. Much of this migration is internal and affects developing 
countries, the south, while researchers have prioritised interna-
tional and north-south migration. The scarcity of research may 
also be on account of what can be called the “economic para-
digm” and the “political paradigm” in explanations of migra-
tion.15
In recent years the environmental factor has become more 
recognised as one factor among many that may influence migra-
tion. Most researchers today agree on the multi-causality of all 
migration, including forced migration. Even in the middle of civil 
war in Angola, Nina M. Birkeland found that displacement had 
complex causes.16 Lack of access to health care and education, 
lack of infrastructure and environmental degradation were some 
reasons mentioned by the displaced themselves. 
Importantly, not all migration related to environmental change is 
necessarily forced migration. Migration is one of the oldest cop-
ing strategies for dealing with environmental change. Particularly 
in semi-arid regions such as the Sahel (the area between Sahara 
and the more fertile region in the south), there are traditions 
of migration such as nomadic pastoralism and long-distance 
trade. Much of this migration is internal and temporary fol-
lowing weather cycles. Where people have a history of crossing 
borders, it may be considered legitimate and legal due to custom 
and tradition, but the control of borders has increased drastically 
in the last decades. Having looked at case studies and historical 
material from the Sahel, Black concludes that much of the migra-
tion could be seen as an essential part of the economic and social 
structure of the region, rather than forced migration caused by 
environmental degradation.17
Migration can depend both on personal characteristics of the 
affected individuals and on various other external conditions. 
Vulnerability can be defined as the “susceptibility of individu-
als and societies to such hazards as conflict and climate change, 
and their capacity to plan for, adapt to and resist changes in their 
environment and living conditions.”18 The degree of vulnerabil-
ity and resilience is contextual and depends on socio-economic 
condition (poverty often makes people vulnerable), gender, age, 
disability, ethnicity, the realisation of human rights and other 
criteria that influence people’s ability to access resources and 
opportunities. Factors often overlap or reinforce each other: 
families’ economic vulnerability may be increased by the regional 
economic structure or activity, such as unequal rights of owner-
ship or the absence of social security arrangements.19 Migration 
is significantly determined by the role of local and national
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institutions, which in turn can be influenced by global socio-
economic and political factors. 
The term ”climate refugees” implies a mono-causality rarely 
found in human reality. No one factor, event or process, inevita-
bly results in migration. This is not to downplay the importance 
of climate change and its effects. Although there is no direct 
causality between the environmental factor and forced migration, 
it is a relevant factor and a root cause that migration specialists 
must take more into account. When it comes to environmental 
and conflict research, there is a corresponding need to import the 
rest of the relevant factors and see the environmental factor in 
the full social, political and economic context. This would result 
in a more realistic picture of future migration related to climate 
change. 
• The term ”climate refugees” implies a mono-causality, 
while in migration there are degrees of force and a 
complex set of influencing factors.
Source: Intergovern-
mental Panel on Cli-
mate Change IPCC 
(2007)
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Key impacts of climate change
There are great methodological challenges in combining climate 
and migration models. Because of the multi-causality of migra-
tion, calculating the population at risk from climate change 
impacts is a long way from predicting mass flight. This relates to 
an important difference in methodology between the migration 
specialist Black and the environmental researcher Myers. While 
Black looks for the links between the environment and migra-
tion in specific cases, Myers has focused on broad-ranging global 
prognoses, including those of the IPCC, which have less direct 
applicability on local levels where adaptation and other factors 
will have an influence. Where Myers does look at specific cases, 
the argumentation appears largely deductive and reductionist / 
isolationist: country x has environmental problems and also large 
numbers of migrants, so there must be a causal link.20 Correla-
tion does not mean that there is necessarily a positive correlation, 
however, and even less that there is causality. It would be rash to 
base predictions on such evidence and methodology.
Particularly when it comes to counting the “new” migrants it is 
important to keep in mind the general demographic trends. Ac-
cording to a 2008 paper by Black and others, global population 
is projected to rise to around 9 billion by 2050.21 If international 
migration remains at 3% of the world’s population, it means that 
number-wise it will rise to 275 million by 2050. Furthermore, the 
young and those living in urban areas, are generally more likely to 
migrate, and an increase of these groups is expected. 
Naturally, the impacts will be most significant when the different 
factors of migration, demography and climate change coincide. 
Importantly, the climate change impacts depend not only on 
natural exposure, but also on the vulnerability and resilience of the 
areas and people, including capacities to adapt. Who are left to 
live in areas that are most exposed to hazards in the first place? 
Often people know about the risks, but urbanisation and poverty 
may force the most vulnerable to accept them. In the 2008 paper, 
Black and others stress that economic losses associated with cli-
mate change can make people even more vulnerable and prevent 
many potential migrants from investing in long-distance migra-
tion. One can expect an increase in the internal and regional 
migration. 
In the following, some of the expected climate change impacts are 
considered, comparing them where possible to past experiences, 
in order to “guesstimate” in more detail about the possible form 
and scope of this future migration. The most extreme climate 
change scenarios are based on climate change tipping points or 
thresholds that could have devastating consequences such as the 
accelerated melting of the Greenland ice sheet with an associated 
rise in sea level and weakening of the Gulf stream. Along with 
these extreme and more unpredictable scenarios, effects of global 
warming on health and economic life that may have additional 
consequences for migration, are also left aside. Sudden disasters 
such as storms and floods; drought and impacts on food and 
water; and sea level rise as forecast by the IPCC for the end of the 
21st century, appear highly relevant for “guesstimates” on migra-
tion. It is difficult, if not impossible, to attribute specific events 
to climate change, but it is clear that climate change will increase 
the exposure of already vulnerable areas and people to natural 
disasters and severe environmental degradation.
Disasters and displacement
A disaster can be defined as “a situation or event, which over-
whelms local capacity, necessitating a request to national or 
international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and 
often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and 
human suffering.”22 Among natural disasters some authors 
distinguish between sudden impact disasters (for example 
floods, earthquakes and landslides), slow-onset disasters (for 
example drought and desertification) and epidemic diseases (for 
example cholera and malaria). Among human-made disasters 
some authors include so-called complex emergencies which can 
have multiple contributing factors such as conflict and natural 
disaster. An overwhelming majority of those affected by natural 
disasters every year (possibly as many as 98 percent) is affected by 
weather-related (hydro-meteorological) disasters, such as floods 
or droughts.23
Every year millions of people loose their homes and belong-
ings in disasters, either directly through the destruction of their 
homes or as a consequence of being evacuated from affected 
areas for their own safety or to facilitate emergency relief opera-
tions. The evidence for actual numbers of “displaced” as opposed 
to “affected” persons is disputed, though. In the most authorita-
tive reports from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) 
and the International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC), numbers of “fatalities” and “affected”
Climate changing migration
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are presented, but there are no separate statistics on “displaced”. 
Some would say affected is synonymous with displaced in these 
cases, but often disaster displacement is more limited in both 
space and time and has characteristics distinguishing it from 
other forms of displacement. 
Sudden disasters such as storms and floods
According to the disaster database EM-DAT, more than 
9000 people are killed and  more than 115 million are affected by 
floods on average every year.24 Over the last decade, more than 96 
percent of the affected lived in Asia.  In the same period, the 
number of reported floods has strongly increased, and with cli-
mate change there is a high likelihood of a further increase in fre-
quency and severity.25 According to the IPCC, climate change 
is likely to result in sea level rise and more intensive storms and 
heavy precipitation. This will greatly increase the risk of disasters 
occurring, especially in heavily populated coastal zones. This 
risk is further amplified by deforestation along the upper reaches 
of rivers, land subsidence in urban areas (due to abstraction of 
groundwater and heavy loading) and the ever greater concentra-
tion of populations. 
According to some authors, natural disasters may become a ma-
jor cause for longer-distance, longer-term migration in Bangla-
Number of people reported affected by natural disasters 1975–2006
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desh.26 Neighbouring India is already building a fence-wall along 
the border. The displacement considered most typical of sudden 
disasters is short-distance and often temporary however. Most 
of the affected are particularly vulnerable (typically poor) people 
in developing countries. Hence, they have little mobility and the 
majority return as soon as possible to reconstruct their homes in 
the disaster zones.27 Climate change impacts are likely to impov-
erish and may reduce their mobility even further. The longer-
term effects of sudden disasters, such as the loss of livelihood 
opportunities, can also trigger migration similar to that triggered 
by drought and slow-onset disasters.
Drought and impacts on freshwater and food production
Hundreds of millions of people are currently without access to 
safe drinking water, and the demand is increasing due to the 
world’s growing population and mounting aspirations. The IPCC 
report predicts a decrease of rain in the already semi-arid to arid 
sub-tropics, increasing evaporation, rising sea levels resulting in 
salinization of coastal groundwater, and glaciers (in for example 
the Himalayas) melting away. According to the report, water 
problems could affect 74 to 250 million people in Africa by 2020 
and more than a billion people in Asia by the 2050s. Food insecu-
rity in the lower latitudes will also increase with temperature rise. 
Physical water scarcity
Approaching physical water scarcity
Economic water scarcity
Little or no water scarcity Not estimated
Definitions and indicators
•   Little or no water scarcity. Abundant water resources relative to use, with less than 25% of water from rivers withdrawn for 
human purposes. 
•   Physical water scarcity (water resources development is approaching or has exceeded sustainable limits). More than 75% of 
river ows are withdrawn for agriculture, industry, and domestic purposes (accounting for recycling of return ows). This 
denition—relating water availability to water demand—implies that dry areas are not necessarily water scarce.
•   Approaching physical water scarcity. More than 60% of river ows are withdrawn. These basins will experience physical water 
scarcity in the near future.
•   Economic water scarcity (human, institutional, and ﬁnancial capital limit access to water even though water in nature is available 
locally to meet human demands). Water resources are abundant relative to water use, with less than 25% of water from rivers 
withdrawn for human purposes, but malnutrition exists. 
Source: International Water Management Institute analysis done for the Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management
in Agriculture using the Watersim model.
Areas of physical and economic water scarcity
Water for Food, Water for Life: A Com-
prehensive Assessment of Water Manage-
ment in Agriculture.  London: Earthscan, 
and Colombo: International Water 
Management Institute, 2007.
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The land degradation is reinforced by desertification, erosion, soil 
salinization and water scarcity. Most vulnerable are developing 
countries where large sections of the population live directly from 
agriculture and many of these from subsistence farming. 
Drought as any other disaster is a complex phenomenon, but 
for some it is always more comfortable to seek explanations in 
nature’s vagaries. In reality, however, many areas today experi-
ence agricultural drought without there being meteorological or 
hydrological drought. On the contrary, the areas may in fact have 
an abundance of rainwater, but the poor still suffer acute drought 
because available water resources are colonised by the powerful. 
Not “everyone loves a good drought”, but there may be quite a 
few people with vested interests in the national and international 
drought industry: Droughts sell well and funds are made avail-
able for everyone from politicians to private contractors.28 While 
not loosing eye of climate change, it is still necessary to distin-
guish between economic and physical water scarcity and consider 
closely how droughts and other disasters are human-made. The 
climate and environmental factor should not overshadow other 
and often intimately inter-linked political and socio-economic 
factors of migration and conflict. We should keep in mind Ama-
rtya Sen’s famous statement that there has never been serious 
famine in a country with a democratic government and a free 
press.29 The Irish Potato Famine is but one among many histori-
cal examples to support this statement.
The migration literature is rather divided on the issue of  
drought-related migration.30 On the one hand, there are many 
historical examples of mass population movements during 
droughts. In the early 1900s, when severe droughts affected the 
West African Sahel, millions of people migrated southward. On 
the other hand, many migration specialists claim that the lack of 
drinking and irrigation water normally generates gradual migra-
tion which is only one (often the last) of several coping strategies 
considered. Thus, the element of force or when the migration 
must be considered forced, may also be less clear than in sudden 
disasters. Long-distance and permanent migration may in some 
cases actually decrease because of increased impoverishment.
The increase in sea level
The sea level is expected to rise due to water expansion (because 
of higher temperatures) and melting ice. According to one IPCC 
emission estimate (scenario A1B), the sea level could increase by 
almost half a meter by 2100. More than 600 million people live in 
low-lying coastal zones. Out of this number, 438 million live in 
Asia and 246 million in the poorest countries of the world. The 
flood zones are particularly populated in South Asia (with the 
Indus and Ganges-Brahmaputra) and East Asia (Mekong and 
Yangtze). If effective measures of mitigation and adaptation are 
not taken, large numbers of people may have to migrate. Such 
migration is most likely to manifest itself gradually as a response 
to the (most likely) long-term process of sea level rise. The ele-
ment of force or when the migration must be considered forced, 
may therefore not always be clear. (The particularities of sub-
merged island states are dealt with later as a question of interna-
tional law and protection.)
• Climate change is likely to lead to an increase in the 
frequency and severity of sudden disasters such as 
floods and storms, triggering an increase in short-term, 
internal and regional displacement particularly in Asia.
• Drought and physical water scarcity is also likely to 
increase, triggering gradual, internal and regional 
migration particularly in Africa and Asia. The element 
or degree of force may be unclear.
• Climate change is likely to result in a rise in sea level, 
triggering an increase in gradual migration particu-
larly in Asia. The element or degree of force may be 
unclear.
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Some argue that climate change will trigger environmental 
conflicts that in turn trigger migration. There are also those who 
argue that migration may in itself trigger environmental conflicts. 
The two conflict constellations relating to the environment and 
migration can be simplified as the following: 
1) Climate change impacts on the environment -> conflict ->  
migration
2) Climate change impacts on the environment -> migration 
-> conflict
There has been scientific research into environmental conflicts 
since the 1970s. A recent development, however, is the security 
discourse and the emphasis on climate change. In April 2007 
climate change and security was brought up for the first time in 
the UN Security Council by the UK Foreign Secretary Margaret 
Beckett who compared the situation to the looming threat of war 
before 1939, and claimed that “an unstable climate risks some of 
the drivers of conflict such as migratory pressures and competi-
tion for resources – getting worse.” The same month some high-
ranking retired US generals released a report claiming that cli-
mate change poses a serious threat to US security by its impacts 
on extremism and terrorism in unstable regions.31 Since then 
there has been a mass production of studies claiming that climate 
change may turn out to be the greatest threat to both national 
and international security.32 The framing of climate change in a 
conflict discourse, culminated of course in October 2007 when Al 
Gore and the IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize.
The two main schools of thought in environmental conflict 
research are the neo-malthusians and the cornucopians.33 The 
neo-malthusians, among them Thomas Homer-Dixon,34 claim 
that population growth leads to over-consumption of resources, 
resource degradation, and finally scarcities, resulting in violent 
competition. Myers operates with premises that are similar to the 
neo-malthusian.
The cornucopians, on the other hand, emphasise the role of 
technology, human ingenuity and cooperation in overcoming 
scarcity. Cooperation rather than conflict may be the response to 
environmental challenges. Some researchers, among them Nils 
Petter Gleditsch,35 claim that it is abundance rather than scarcity 
of resources that often leads to conflict – because rebel groups 
draw funding from the exploitation of natural resources and / 
or it is a conflict about the control of valuable resources. Black 
seems closer to the position of the cornucopians. While Somalia, 
Rwanda and Haiti are used as examples by the neo-malthusians, 
those who claim abundance, rather than scarcity, fuels conflict 
point to countries such as the DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, 
Angola, Algeria, and Colombia. 
Approaching the issue of climate change with the premise that 
it leads to violent conflict may be an obstacle to a more precise 
examination of the processes and adaptive mechanisms and 
strategies involved. It is axiomatic that conflict, as such, is not 
necessarily a problem. Conflicts can be productive and linked to 
social progress. What matters is how the conflicts are handled so 
that they do not become violent. In general, the role of the state 
and adaptive capacity are crucial for whether violent conflict 
breaks out or not. A consensus remains in environmental conflict 
research regarding the main findings on multi-causality, locality 
and the role and capacity of the state and society. Unsurprisingly, 
these are similar to the conclusions regarding forced migration:36
• The environment is only one of several inter-connected 
causes of conflict and is rarely considered to be the most 
decisive factor.
• The conflicts believed to involve an environmental ele-
ment, have mostly taken place within a country (intrastate 
conflicts). 
• The role of the state, and more generally society’s problem-
solving capacity, is crucial. In places where political and 
societal institutions are weak, there is a higher probability of 
conflict occurring.
Extensive climate changes may alter and threaten the living conditions of much 
of mankind. They may induce large-scale migration and lead to greater compe-
tition for the earth’s resources. Such changes will place particularly heavy bur-
dens on the world’s most vulnerable countries. There may be increased danger 
of violent conflicts and wars, within and between states.
(Excerpt from the Nobel Committee’s explanation for the award of the 2007 
Nobel Peace Prize)
A climate of conflict
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Environmental conflict influencing migration 
Forced migration can be triggered by environmental conflicts. In 
this case the link between the environmental factor and forced 
migration is indirect. Initially the environmental change results in 
violent conflict, and only in a second phase are the affected forced 
to flee due to the violence. These migrants appear to fall into the 
category of persons fleeing generalised violence (often popularly 
referred to as war refugees). The environment may be seen as a 
root cause, however, and from this point of view conflict can be 
interpreted as the transfer mechanism. 
There are several climate change-related conflict constellations 
that can result in migration. The climate change impacts that can 
impact on migration, are also relevant for considering conflict 
potential, and again one can draw upon historical examples in 
the speculations and predictions. Furthermore, conflicts them-
selves often exacerbate environmental degradation which may as 
already demonstrated, result in migration. These vicious circles 
make the isolation of different factors difficult.
Sudden disasters and conflict 
As a rule, sudden disasters tend to heighten dissatisfaction with 
the ruling government.37 Weak and/or unsatisfactory state struc-
tures are exposed during and after disasters. When a devastating 
typhoon hit Bangladesh in 1970,  the country was part of Paki-
stan and dominated politically and militarily by (West-)Pakistan. 
The trifling aid and apparent indifference of central political 
leaders strengthened the Bangladeshi separatist movement. Paki-
stani oppression of the movement eventually lead to civil war and 
independence for Bangladesh in 1971.38 Hurricane Katharina
Causes of conflict 
Due to the multi-causality of conflicts, the major factors that are generally considered important in escalation or de-escalation of conflict should also be taken into 
account. There is widespread unanimity that countries especially prone to violent intrastate conflict have at least one – though generally several – of the following 
characteristics:
• They are anocratic (neither clearly democratic nor clearly autocratic). While democracies permit the expression of opinions and autocracies effectively prevent 
and suppress uprisings, anocracies do not permit expression of opposition yet cannot suppress it effectively.
• They have weak state structures and capacities. Ineffective management of the state monopoly of violence, will for example make the state more vulner-
able. 
• They do badly when it comes to economic performance and distributive justice. Some researchers believe there is a linear causality – i.e. the higher per capita 
economic performance, the lower risk of conflict – while others see a non-linear dynamic and claim that economic growth in very poor countries can actually 
give rise to political instability while growth causes a reduction of such risk in already rich countries. The distribution of economic prosperity seems undoubt-
edly relevant: States where the gap is large between the most affluent and the poorest, are prone to conflict. In this regard some authors emphasise the impor-
tance of land rights and land use systems in agriculture-based economies. The existence of natural resources and how these are used are a crucial factor. 
• They have a large population and/or a high population density. Some see a high population growth in combination with a scarcity of utilizable land as a de-
cisive factor. Cultural and ethnic differences do not necessarily increase the risk, but collective identities can be instrumentalized for political purposes. Thus 
the real danger is in deliberate political exploitation of such differences. 
• They have rough terrain. This may function as defensive cover for rebel groups.
• They border on a neighbouring country in which a violent conflict is being waged. Such a location has the risk of overspill because of infiltration, provision 
of rebel cover, refugee movement, so-called ideological infection and feelings of solidarity.
• They have recently experienced violent conflict on their own state territory. 
The research shows that interstate conflicts and wars are likely to occur above all when: 
• There is a conflict of interest between a democracy and an autocracy. Democracies will seldom wage war against each other.
• Territorial conflicts become virulent. 
• A balance of power exists between states (or an existing imbalance of power decreases).
• No or only few (economic, political etc.) interdependencies exist.
• The countries are neighbours.
• They have a history of violence, i.e. the conflicting parties have already been in conflict or at war in the past. 
(Based on the presentation of causes of conflict in Climate Change as a Security Risk, German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), London, 2007.)
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(in the USA in 2006) illustrated that not only what we normally 
think of as developing countries, have their weaknesses and 
injustices revealed by climate change impacts. 
Where a conflict between two clearly defined parties has al-
ready entered a phase of reduced tension, natural disasters can 
represent opportunities to overcome entrenched differences.39 
This may have manifested itself in for example the peace agree-
ment between the Free Aceh Movement and Indonesia after the 
2004 tsunami and agreements on relief efforts between India 
and Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. (Related to 
earthquakes, neither of these natural disasters were influenced by 
climate.)
According to the German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(WBGU), the sudden disaster conflicts are likely to occur more 
frequently in future: Firstly, regions at risk, particularly Central 
America, generally have weak economic and political capaci-
ties, making adaptation and crisis management very difficult. 
Secondly, storm and flood disasters along the densely populated 
coasts of the Indian subcontinent and China can cause major 
damage and trigger or intensify migration processes which in 
turn could trigger conflict.40 Parallel with the growing risk of 
sudden disasters, Bangladesh is furthermore plagued by political 
violence and a growing trend toward Islamist extremism.
Drought and conflict 
Water scarcity may trigger distributional conflicts. Water scar-
city by itself does not necessarily lead to conflict and violence, 
though. There is an interaction with other socio-economic and 
political factors: The potential for conflict often relates to social 
discrimination in terms of access to safe and clean water. The risk 
can therefore be reduced by ensuring just distribution so that 
people in disadvantaged areas also have access to the safe and 
clean water. As already pointed out, a main problem today (and 
probably for the near future) is still the so-called economic water 
scarcity, and good water management can prevent conflict. 
Within states, groups have often defended or challenged tradi-
tional rights of water use: In semi-arid regions such as the Sahel 
there have been tensions between farmers and nomadic herd-
ers. According to The Stern Review on The Economics of Climate 
Change,41 the droughts in the Sahel in the 1970s and 1980s may 
have been caused partly by climate change and contributed to 
increased competition for scarce resources between these groups. 
The Tuareg rebellion in Mali in the beginning of the 1990s, is also 
mentioned as an example of a climate change-related conflict. 
Many of the drought-struck nomads sought refuge in the cities 
or left the country. The lack of social networks for the returnees, 
the continuing drought, competition for land with the settled 
farmers and dissatisfaction with the authorities, were factors that 
fuelled the armed rebellion. 
In the past there have been few examples of “water wars” between 
states. In fact there are several cases of cooperation (for example 
between Palestine and Israel), but these have generally concerned 
benefit-sharing, not burden-sharing. According to Fred Pearce, 
the defining crises of the 21st century will involve water.42 He sees 
the Six Day War in 1967 between Israel and its neighbours as the 
first modern “water war”, specifically over the River Jordan. Most 
of the world’s major rivers cross international boundaries, but 
are not covered by treaties. According to Pearce, this is a recipe 
for conflict and for upstream users to hold downstream users to 
ransom. This could be helped by internationally brokered deals 
for sharing such rivers. 
Soil degradation can also trigger food crises and further under-
mine the economic performance of weak and unstable states, 
thereby leading to destabilisation, the collapse of social systems, 
and violent conflicts. Yet it is migration, rather than violence, that 
has been the typical response to the famines that have affected 
the most people.43 
Migration influencing environmental conflict 
In research into environmental conflicts, the environmental 
change–migration-conflict linkage is one of the most frequently 
mentioned scenarios and topics for case studies, and several 
climate and security reports consider migration to be one of 
the most worrisome aspects of climate change.44 There is some 
empirical evidence that migration may trigger or exacerbate 
existing conflicts. Politicisation of ethnicity, the financial role of a 
diaspora and export of existing conflicts are possible connections 
between migration and conflict. Much focus has been on how 
forced migration can create environmental problems, and  the 
UNHCR has operated programmes such as planting trees around 
camps. Their 1996 Environmental Guidelines recognised that
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Darfur
Darfur is often used to illustrate how climate change can interact with other factors to trigger violent conflict. When Darfur first made headlines, the most common 
explanation of the violent conflict emphasised the ethnic differences between Arabs and Africans. More recently, prominent officials such as UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-Moon have argued that “the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change (“A Climate Culprit in Darfur,” in The 
Washington Post, 16.06.2007).” 
UNEP’s post-conflict environmental assessment (Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UNEP, 2007) indicates that there is a very strong link between 
land degradation, desertification and conflict in Darfur. The boundary between desert and semi-desert is shifting southwards partly due to declining precipitation. 
Several authors attribute this to climate change, while others maintain that the semi-arid Sahel with strong climate variability is not a good case for illustrating or 
proving climate change. The 20-year drought, regardless of cause, played an important role by reducing the land available for farming and herding, but as the UNEP 
assessment also recognises, climate (and/or environmental) change alone does not offer the full explanation for the outbreak or the extent of the violent conflict. All 
countries in the Sahel have felt the impact of global warming, but so far only Sudan has experienced such devastating conflict. 
The ethnic dimension does not offer a full explanation either: Political and military alliances frequently shifted depending on pragmatic rather than ethnic consider-
ations. Furthermore, some tribes practice both herding and crop cultivation so there is not always clear tribal distinctions between farmers and herders. 
When the north-south civil war broke out again in the mid-1980s, however, the central government used Arab militias as a means of keeping the southern rebels 
at bay in Darfur. Raising an army is expensive so the Khartoum regime used a strategy often employed in warfare: they armed others to do the work of the army. A 
balance was upset, and ethnic identity became more politicised. This fed into the escalation of conflicts over land issues. 
The conflict itself has taken a further toll on already scarce resources. Militias in Darfur intentionally destroyed forests and the natural livelihood base of people, 
resulting in further displacement. The massive scale of displacement also has serious consequences for the environment. Around the camps for displaced people, the 
collection of shelter materials and firewood can cause serious deforestation and soil erosion. UNEP’s assessment indicates that some international aid programmes 
may also cause significant harm to the environment, and there may be vicious circles of (particularly food) aid dependence, agricultural underdevelopment and 
environmental degradation. This is detrimental to Darfur’s existing problems of drought, desertification and disputes over land-use – factors that contributed to 
the conflict in the first place. 
“the negative environmental impacts associated with refugee situ-
ations must be better understood and dealt with.”
Much of the forced migration related to climate change, is likely 
to be internal, regional and short-term or temporary. In transit or 
the place of destination, (particularly mass) migration may (be 
perceived to and/or) contribute to competition for already scarce 
resources such as land and water. During a drought people may 
move to a less affected region, resulting in rising demand there. 
A competitive situation is more likely where population growth 
is strong. Climate change may also lead to further increases in 
rural-urban migration because of the degradation of land and 
people searching for better livelihoods. This may result in grow-
ing slums and an increased competition for resources in cities. 
There may also be competition and potential for conflict when 
migrants return to areas of origin and issues arise such as owner-
ship or rights of use.
The conflict potential of migration depends to a significant 
degree on how the government and people in the place of transit, 
destination or return respond. Governance, the degree of political 
stability, the economy and whether there is a history of violence 
are generally important factors. 
• Sudden disasters such as storms and floods often high-
light weaknesses of the government in power, thereby 
triggering or exacerbating existing intrastate conflict 
which in turn can trigger forced migration.
• The degradation of freshwater resources can trigger 
intrastate conflict which in turn can trigger forced 
migration. Migration has been more likely than violent 
conflict as a response to famines.
• The forced migrants can contribute to a competition 
for already scarce resources such as land and water, 
but several other factors, including governance, are 
important in determining conflict potential.
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The Transmigrasi 
Indonesia’s Transmigrasi programme was designed to resettle families from the densely populated inner islands to the outer. When Suharto’s regime collapsed in 
1998, conflicts between indigenous groups and settlers became violent. A common portrayal sought the explanation in ethnic hatred that broke out as the military 
control weakened, but environmental factors also played a role.
The Transmigrasi was part of the government’s modernisation and commercialisation plan. Market crops were introduced with the settlers into islands where the 
indigenous people lived off subsistence agriculture and hunting. The settlers cleared the land and native forest (and many worked for logging companies) and tried 
to set up agriculture and cash crops with little knowledge of local conditions. Soon the natural environment that had sustained the indigenous population for cen-
turies, was devastated and the people marginalised and impoverished. 
Clearly the environmental factor was an important factor of the resulting conflict. Other factors include the political (the establishment of Javanese military to 
strengthen central control of the outer islands), the economic and the demographic.
(See the IDMC non-conflict displacement report and Castles, Stephen (2002), ”Environmental change and forced migration: making sense of the debate”, Working 
Paper No. 70 , UNHCR.)
Forced migration model
In one way or another, all countries will eventually be affected by 
climate change, but some are more immediately and particularly 
exposed and vulnerable. The IPCC report highlights the follow-
ing group of countries:
• Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
• Africa
• Mega-deltas (particularly in Asia)
• The polar regions
As already mentioned, impacts of climate change depend not 
only on exposure to the physical effects of climate change, but 
also crucially on vulnerability/resilience and adaptive capacity. 
The location of the hazards/disasters are not predicted to change 
much in the near future, but the severity and frequency is likely 
to increase. Vulnerability and resilience is therefore likely to be 
a determining factor in the geographical location of “hotspots”. 
The IPCC have “high confidence” that “Africa is one of the most 
vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability, 
a situation aggravated by the interaction of ‘multiple stresses’, 
occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity.”45 The UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) also 
recognises SIDS and Africa as being particularly vulnerable, and 
adds to this list the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). From 
migration and environmental conflict research, one can conclude 
that states and societies, in which the general factors of forced 
migration or conflict apply, are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change. 
Whenever there is a disaster, it is likely to be largest in terms of 
the number of persons affected, in countries with high popula-
tions such as India and China. The Caribbean, amongst other 
regions, is also exposed to cyclones and other sudden disas-
ters - though with fewer persons at risk. Apart from Africa, and 
particularly the Sahel and the Nile area, the Stern report focuses 
on Central Asia as a potential hotspot for future drought-related 
conflict. Central Asia is also highlighted by Pearce. 
The conflict and forced migration hotspots largely overlap. Faced 
with climate change, there may be an increase in planned migra-
tion that is longer-distance, longer-term and more permanent. 
Increased urbanisation with the possibility of secondary migra-
tion can also be expected. Some studies include North America 
as a destination for migration, particularly from Central America 
and the Caribbean, and Europe as a destination for migration 
particularly from Northern Africa.46 But, as already mentioned, 
most of the forced migration related to climate change, is likely 
to be internal and regional, particularly concentrated in Asia and 
Africa. While the developed countries bear the main responsibil-
ity for climate change, one could question whether the dynamics 
of climate change, conflict and forced migration can and should 
be portrayed as a threat image of masses of refugees flooding over 
western borders. The sad truth is that there will be real floods, 
and if nothing changes, many of the affected will have little 
choice but to return and risk further flooding.
• Considering that impacts of climate change depend on 
exposure as well as vulnerability/resilience, it is likely 
that developing countries in lower latitudes will con-
tinue in the near future to be the hotspots in several 
senses of the word.
“Hotspots”
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Security risks associated with climate change: Selected hotspots
The map only shows 
the regions which are 
dealt with in the WBGU 
report 2007 and which 
could develop into crisis 
hotspots.
Source: German Advi-
sory Council on Global 
Change  WBGU (2007): 
Climate Change as a Se-
curity Risk.
Having looked at the form and scope of the forced migration that 
is likely to arise from climate change impacts, this second part 
of the report investigates how the migrants can be categorised, 
something which has a bearing on questions of protection and 
assistance. In an investigation of the concept of environmental or 
climate refugees and evaluation of protection gaps, one can draw 
upon some of the basic concepts and categories of migration.
“Ecomigrants”
“Migrant” can be considered the overarching and general term 
(cf. migration). To various degrees, the different categories of 
migrants have their position regulated and protected by law.47 So-
called economic migrants do not have a very strong position in 
international law.48 This migration is often very linked to socio-
economic conditions. Marxist critique emphasises the element of 
force in such migration and claims it is not recognised because of 
the liberal-political nature of international law. 
Some authors believe there is no significant difference between 
economic migrants and those migrating due to environmental 
change. “Ecomigrants” has been suggested as a concept that 
reflects that migration frequently has both an economic and an 
ecological element and a clear separation is difficult.49 The small-
scale farmer, who finally abandons his land due to gradual soil 
degradation, leaves because there is an increasing lack of oppor-
tunities of livelihood. In this aspect he or she is like the so-called 
economic migrant. Gradual environmental degradation can 
cause significantly more far-reaching and permanent migration 
than sudden disasters. The question of choice is linked to the 
degree of severity. When is the soil so degraded that the farmer is 
forced leave? At what stage in this gradual process are we dealing 
with forced migration rather than voluntary migration? These 
are questions that are best answered on a case-by-case basis, and 
there is a risk that many migrants will be treated as economic 
migrants in a liberal-political interpretation of law. 
Refugees
There are an estimated 14.3 million refugees in the world.50 A 
moderate or strong increase over the past years has been re-
corded in all areas – with the exception of Europe where talk of 
“bogus asylum seekers”, “economic refugees”, the War on Terror 
and other factors have contributed to strengthening the walls of 
“Fortress Europe”. Pakistan and Iran together hosted more than 
2 million refugees with Afghanistan being the main country of 
origin. One and a half million Iraqis have found refuge mainly 
in neighbouring countries. Sudan, with more than half a million 
of its nationals outside the country, is the third largest refugee-
producing country. 
Refugees have fled persecution and lack protection in their 
country. Therefore, they are considered to be in particular need 
of international protection and have a unique legal status with 
certain pertaining rights. In other words, “refugee” is a term with 
legal implications. According to the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees article 1A a “refugee” is 
“[…] any person who […] owing to a well-founded fear 
of  being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is 
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country […]” (The 1967 Protocol has 
removed a geographical and temporal restriction.)
The 1951 Refugee Convention and its definition is a product 
of Europe in the immediate post-World-War-II period, and it 
has come under heavy attack for not catering for the problems 
of today’s world, such as mass displacement through war and 
generalised violence in several developing countries. A majority 
of the persons in need of protection and assistance do not qualify 
as refugees. How to deal with the asylum-migration nexus (or 
mixed migration), has become a frequent discussion topic in 
forced migration circles.
It is worth noting from this definition, that a refugee has fled his 
or her country due to persecution on one or more grounds in 
an exhaustive list. Climate change and environmental change is 
not to be found in this definition. There are regional instruments 
with somewhat broader definitions of refugees, but none ex-
plicitly grant refugee status for environmental or climate change 
reasons. (The African convention and the American Cartagena 
declaration recognise inter alia events that seriously disturb pub-
lic order, however.)
The “social group” ground can be interesting to explore.  There 
are two main theories regarding what constitutes a social group;
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one arguing that it is crucial that the group has fundamental or 
inherent protected characteristics, the other emphasising (external) 
social perception. Environmental or climate refugees may consti-
tute “a social group composed of persons lacking political power 
to protect their own environment.”51 Persecution itself cannot 
define the social group, though, and such an interpretation of 
the generally underexplored and unclear “social group” ground 
is highly controversial. After assessing the criteria of the 1951 
Convention, a majority of authors conclude that persons whose 
displacement relate to environmental change, do not meet the 
requirements to be defined as “refugees”.
Importantly, people leave because they are persecuted in some 
way on these grounds. Hence, persecution is a key term. In reality 
a person may not for example be politically active, but if someone 
believes him or her to be politically active and therefore perse-
cutes him or her, (s)he may become a refugee. The term “perse-
cution” is not defined, but serious or systematic human rights 
violations are normally considered to amount to persecution. 
The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Deter-
mining Refugee Status concludes that “a threat to life or freedom 
on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership of a particular social group is always persecution. 
Other serious violations of human rights – for the same reasons – 
would also constitute persecution.”52 As there is no set definition, 
there is place for evolution of the concept. Persecution through 
violation of economic, social and cultural rights is more and 
more recognised. The persecution and link to the convention 
grounds must be considered in light of the availability of state 
protection. The definition covers both the situations where the 
state does not provide protection for one of the grounds and the 
situations where someone is persecuted for one of the recognised 
grounds (by a non-state agent) and the state simply does not 
protect. 
“Environmental persecution” has been defined as occurring 
“when governments knowingly induce environmental deg-
radation and that degradation harms people by forcing them 
to migrate.”53 It may be stretching the term too much to talk 
of climate change persecution. Who would in that case be the 
persecutor(s)? The state that directly fails to protect its citizens 
from the impacts, and/or the states that are the most responsible 
for the climate change? This sort of reasoning may however lead 
to innovation in international normative development. If a par-
ticular ethnic/religious/national/social/political group is discrim-
inated against and left to live in an area prone to environmental 
degradation or sudden disasters such as floods, and the govern-
ment does not protect them by for example adaptation schemes, 
one could argue that some of them may become refugees because 
of persecution on one of the recognised grounds. The environ-
mental factor comes in not as a ground, but as a form of persecu-
tion. Such interpretations are not impossible, but they conflict 
with the liberal-political view that persecution is seen to require 
ill-will and a deliberate act (not merely an omission) on the part 
of the state or a non-state party. There may also be more direct 
persecution related to the environment: persecutors may use, as is 
often done in conflicts, environmental destruction to undermine 
people’s livelihood. The environmental destruction could then be 
seen as an active form of persecution. 
Although environmental problems may have contributed in trig-
gering social disorder and is seen as a root cause by some authors, 
those who flee a so-called environmental conflict, are in fact 
fleeing situations of generalised violence. In some places, these 
forced migrants (often popularly referred to as “war refugees”) 
are recognised and granted the same or a similar status to the 
1951 Convention refugees. Alternatively, such as in the directives 
for a common European asylum system, they may be granted a 
subsidiary status of protection, or as a minimum be protected 
against return through non-refoulement (explained below).
Submerged islands and statelessness
Situated only centimetres above water, Tuvalu, an island state 
in the western Pacific, is expected to become uninhabitable by 
2050, and its leaders are actively seeking solutions to this strange 
problem.54 The islanders risk becoming stateless – as stateless 
as you can possibly be. Not only the physical island, but all the 
institutions of a modern state – parliament, police, law courts, 
state education, healthcare and other welfare institutions – may 
disappear. In theory, the islanders could reconstitute their vanish-
ing state elsewhere. Indeed, Tuvalu has considered the option 
of buying an island or piece of land from another country, but 
possible sellers, such as New Zealand, have not been overly posi-
tive. Despite the desire of the around 10 000 Tuvaluans to stay on 
the islands, and the fear that their cultural heritage might be lost, 
migration or relocation to other states may be the only realistic 
option. 
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The Pacific Access Category (PAC) is an immigration agreement 
with New Zealand. The country has decided to accept an annual 
quota of migrants from island states such as Tuvalu. It is not very 
different from ordinary migration arrangements. The PAC does 
not employ the term environmental or climate refugee, nor does 
it mention the threat of climate change or state any responsibility 
for the displacement of these populations. 
Statelessness and attempts to deal with statelessness is not a new 
phenomenon. According to a Refugees Magazine with a special 
report on the stateless, the official figure of stateless persons in 
the world today is 5.8 million, while the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that the true 
total is probably closer to 15 million.55 What must be a rather sel-
dom phenomenon, however, is the complete extinction of a state 
without there being any successor state. Several difficult questions 
arise regarding the rights of the affected population and who 
would be responsible for protecting them, and there may be a 
serious protection gap in law on statelessness. 
Non-refoulement
In human rights law (which has a much broader application than 
refugee law), the principle of non-refoulement is an absolute and 
general ban on returning people to places where they risk certain 
ill-treatment. The principle has a prominent place in several 
human rights instruments: According to case-law, the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms article 
3, the ban on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, 
implies the duty not to expel a person to a place where he or she 
could be in danger of being exposed to the prohibited treat-
ment.56 The Human Rights Committee has said the same about 
article 7 in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Article 3 in the Convention Against Torture can also be 
relied upon by a person facing the danger of torture if returned. 
Most agree that the prohibition on torture is a customary prin-
ciple, but there is disagreement regarding the extent to which 
one is protected by customary law against lesser ill-treatment. 
At some point one is dealing with more purely humanitarian 
considerations than hard legal obligations. The exact scope and 
interpretation of the peremptory norm may be contested, but 
clearly non-refoulement protection may be relevant in situations 
of climate change-related forced migration. Persons fleeing con-
flict situations with an environmental element, can find protec-
tion in non-refoulement, but it can apply even broader. In some 
cases people simply cannot return:
• The place they came from no longer exists as in the case of 
submerged island states. The question of statelessness may 
be partly addressed here.
• The place they came from can no longer sustain its entire 
population leading to the expulsion of certain groups. In 
such cases one can also consider whether it is persecution 
and the 1951 definition applies.
• The place they came from can no longer sustain its entire 
population leading to a prohibition to return once one has 
left.
In other cases, people cannot reasonably be expected to return 
to the place they came from, because of livelihood and quality 
of life considerations.57 In all these cases the migrants could be 
in need of international protection – that is, protection outside 
their country – just like refugees are. One reason refugees are 
still considered a category apart among international migrants is 
the protection aspect: if other migrants choose to return home 
they will continue to receive the protection of their government, 
while refugees who flee because of persecution, cannot return 
safely to their homes unless there is a fundamental shift in the 
situation. With today’s climate change scenarios even gradual 
environmental degradation may in some areas reach such a criti-
cal point that it would in fact be almost impossible to return or 
unreasonable to expect anyone to return. These persons could be 
granted humanitarian asylum or some other protected status. In 
the proposal for new asylum legislation in Norway the distinction 
between persons who cannot be returned due to international 
obligations such as non-refoulement and persons with refugee sta-
tus (currently given only to those who meet the 1951 Convention 
criteria) ceases, and both groups are considered refugees. The 
principle of non-refoulement could also protect persons against 
internal returns to certain areas within the same country.
Internally displaced persons
Most of the migrants will differ from the refugees for an impor-
tant reason mentioned in the 1951 Convention: They are not 
“outside the country of (his) nationality”. Internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) have fled their homes, but unlike refugees they 
have not crossed an international border. According to the Global 
Overview from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
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(IDMC), the total conflict-related IDP population was estimated 
to be 26 million at the end of 2007.58 Africa hosted almost half of 
the population (12.7 million people), and Sudan with 5.8 million 
was the country with the highest number of IDPs. Although 
IDPs far outnumber refugees, their plight still receives much less 
international attention. 
The protection needs of IDPs were not very clearly catered for 
in international law – there was an apparent protection gap. 
“Internally displaced person” is not itself a legal term with legal 
implications, but several rights and systems of law have even-
tually been identified as relevant in their particular situation. 
Rather than creating a separate convention, the 1998 Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement is a synthesis, drawing 
out relevant parts of human rights law, refugee law by analogy 
and international humanitarian law / laws of war. Arguably, the 
principles should be considered legally binding to the extent that 
they reflect existing, binding international law. This approach 
has been considered an innovation in international normative 
development. 
National governments have the primary responsibility for people 
on their territory, and this has been a main challenge in the pro-
tection of IDPs. In many cases it is the very same state that has
Internally Displaced People Worldwide 2007
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persecuted the displaced, which is supposed to provide protec-
tion. The state is often unwilling or unable to protect and in 
some cases even denies the entry of international protection 
and assistance agencies by referring to the principles of national 
sovereignty and non-interference. The first Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General on IDPs, Francis Deng, developed a 
concept of sovereignty as responsibility to protect (R2P). There is 
still not one mandated agency for the protection of and assistance 
to IDPs, but UNHCR now has a special role and accountability as 
cluster lead. According to the IDMC Global Overview, a signifi-
cant number of IDPs still suffer from a protection and assistance 
deficit. 
“Internally displaced persons” are according to the broad and de-
scriptive definition in the Introduction of the Guiding Principles:
“[…] persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disas-
ters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized 
State border.” 
The inclusion of disasters is a recognition that persons displaced 
by disasters also have protection needs requiring international 
attention. The IDMC report on non-conflict induced displace-
ment claims that many individuals and communities displaced 
by natural disasters confront similar problems and present simi-
lar challenges to those displaced in conflicts.59 For example, the 
displaced may be in camps, be unable to return home, and may 
lack formal property title, thus hindering return and the rees-
tablishment of livelihood. Occasionally, governments have been 
known to respond to natural disasters by discriminating against 
or neglecting certain groups on political or ethnic grounds or by 
violating their human rights in other ways. On the other hand, 
the IDMC report notes, the human rights aspects of disasters 
seem to be increasingly recognised, and there are national and 
international systems in place to respond to disasters backed by 
a political will and in most cases the financial resources neces-
sary. The International Federation for the Red Cross and the Red 
Crescent Societies in particular plays an important monitoring 
and advocacy role.
It is not so clear whether those who move due to more gradual 
environmental degradation are covered by the Principles. 
Drought and environmental degradation can possibly be 
included as slow-onset disasters. Furthermore, the list is not 
exhaustive (“in particular”), and the definition may open for an 
evolutionary approach to displacement and protection. It could 
also be argued that environmental degradation could be consid-
ered development displacement because of the role of the state 
and influence of other political factors on such migration. “De-
velopment” as a cause of displacement is not explicitly included 
in the IDP definition but large sections deal with displacement 
related to development (or the lack of it) in the main document 
(particularly principle 6) and in the annotations by Walter Kälin. 
An important consideration here as well is whether (and when) 
those moving due to gradual environmental degradation are 
more similar to voluntary/economic migrants or those consid-
ered forcibly displaced. It is possible that in the beginning people 
will migrate voluntarily because the traditional forms of income 
or employment are insufficient. These would not necessarily be 
considered IDPs. Some of their needs may be addressed by devel-
opment agencies. If with time, the question is not of economic 
improvement but of pure survival, then they could be considered 
IDPs. There can also be a visibility challenge in gradual envi-
ronmental degradation in contrast to more sensational sudden 
disasters portrayed in the media.
The question of IDP categorisation is important not only from a 
legal point of view, but also when it comes to qualifying for assis-
tance as many organisations provide relief and development sup-
port to target groups identified in their own mandates. Birkeland 
claims that environmental factors are seldom given due attention 
and that in many situations of displacement there are immense 
differences between those whom the displaced themselves per-
ceive as displaced and whom the external actors will include in 
their mandates. Hence, she concludes, it is important to secure an 
inclusive understanding of the IDP category rather than trying 
to fit displaced into separate categories such as environmental or 
climate refugees in order to secure rights and assistance.60 
Better international burden- and responsibility-sharing
An important rationale for international protection and assis-
tance is that some of the states most vulnerable to climate change 
impacts, may be unwilling or unable to protect the migrants. 
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Even though one cannot isolate the environmental factor in the 
migration decision, and the line between forced and voluntary 
migration is often blurred, we should also remember that it is 
the rich and developed countries who are most at fault for the 
climate change and that climate change impacts can trigger or 
exacerbate conflict and migration. Albeit in a more indirect way 
(and even if one does not define it as persecution), these coun-
tries also have a responsibility towards those affected. 
Different actors have come with a range of suggestions as to how 
the international protection gap should be dealt with. Some be-
lieve an additional element – fleeing for environmental reasons – 
could be incorporated in the 1951 Refugee Convention definition 
by the adoption of an additional protocol. As already mentioned, 
persecution is a key term in this convention, though, and the 
system and structure may not be suitable for the dynamics of 
climate change and forced migration. Moreover, there is, accord-
ing to most migration specialists, a very real risk that it would 
weaken the protection available to the Convention refugees. 
Refugee law is already under pressure in many countries, and any 
change in the Convention could be for the worse. 
Another way to address the protection gap, would be to draft and 
adopt a completely new and separate international convention. 
In a new convention one could draw upon environmental law as 
well as human rights and refugee law.61 Weaknesses that need to 
be overcome in the environmental branch of international law 
relate to enforcement, and the difficulties in establishing liability, 
making protection based on responsibility difficult. Much more 
research would be needed, however, before concrete measures are 
identified and could be made binding in the form of a conven-
tion. In so far as one tries to deal with protection of individual 
forced migrants, the 1951 Convention refugees could risk being 
redefined and channelled into a new convention with possibly 
lower protection standards. 
A third alternative is to follow an approach similar to the one 
taken in the case of IDPs, that is, investigate the protection gaps 
more closely and if possible, create a synthesis of existing (and 
analogy of) international law in the form of principles. As this 
chapter already indicates, further investigation of existing pro-
tection possibilities could prove useful. Much more research is 
needed in this field. Some of the protection gaps one is left with 
after such research, could perhaps be addressed in the ongoing 
debate on how to deal with mixed migration / the asylum-migra-
tion nexus. 
Since most forced migration will probably be internal and 
regional, resettlement and financial obligations are other 
importants aspects of burden-sharing. A new international 
environmental migration fund could provide the financial basis 
for measures to deal with the forced migration.62 In addition to 
“the ability-to-pay” principle, the burden-sharing mechanism 
could be based on “the polluter pays” principle (principle 7 of 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development), 
linking contributions to the level of country-specific greenhouse 
gas emissions as well as other indicators such as Gross National 
Product. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) contains an appendix constituting a global adapta-
tion fund. The costs of forced migrations could also perhaps be 
considered as costs of adaptation.
As already demonstrated, many of the forced migrants will prob-
ably fit into already existing categories of protected persons, but 
they may need to be made more visible and recognised within 
the categories. A strengthening and developing of these existing 
protection and assistance mechanisms is also needed. Hope-
fully, climate change increases the focus on the plight of people 
trapped in their own countries as well as forced migration more 
generally in the developing countries. The tenth anniversary of 
the Guiding Principles this year, can also help set the spotlight on 
the insufficiencies of the current protection regime for IDPs. 
• The forced migrants whose displacement relates to cli-
mate change impacts, are not automatically excluded 
by the 1951 Refugee Convention definition. The envi-
ronmental degradation or disaster cannot come in as a 
persecution ground, but it could perhaps be considered 
the form of persecution.
• A person fleeing an environmental conflict should be 
granted the same protection status as others fleeing 
generalised violence.
• When it comes to the island states that risk becoming 
submerged, there may be a serious protection gap in
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existing law on statelessness. Some sort of regula-
tion or agreement on a regional or international level 
should be considered.
• In cases of severe environmental degradation and 
sudden disasters, the human rights principle of non-
refoulement could protect against return when this 
must be seen to involve ill-treatment above a certain 
threshold. 
• Many of these forced migrants will fall in under the 
definition of internally displaced persons (IDPs), but 
their protection will largely depend on whether or not 
the international organisations include them in their 
mandates (operational protection gaps). 
• Particularly for those considered to have moved due 
to gradual environmental degradation, there may be 
operational and normative protection gaps, internally 
and internationally, because they risk being considered 
economic or voluntary migrants.
• Existing law and protection possibilities should be 
further investigated to identify and address potential 
protection gaps. More research is needed.
• Financial resources must be made available for coun-
tries to deal with problems of forced migration related 
to the environment.
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If it is better to prevent than to cure, one should not only address 
the question of how to protect and assist those forced to migrate 
by environmental and other factors, but also address the factors 
themselves – that is, try to deal with the root causes of forced 
migration and conflict. Here Myers has several constructive 
recommendations such as foreign aid measures to help develop-
ing countries deal with environmental challenges. Developed 
countries must take the lead in mitigation. Because developing 
countries are the most exposed and vulnerable, it is also crucial to 
provide assistance to these countries in dealing with displacement 
and prevention, including climate change adaptation. 
Mitigation now
The impacts of human-induced climate change can have serious 
consequences for conflict and forced migration. From a humani-
tarian perspective, mitigation must be a top priority. We must 
keep this century’s global temperature rise within the critical 2 
°C threshold above pre-industrial levels. The Stern Review on The 
Economics of Climate Change concluded that solutions to climate 
change are affordable. If we fail, it will be because there was a lack 
of political will to cooperate. 
Mitigation is about transforming the way that we produce and 
use energy so it will be sustainable. Mitigation measures include 
emission cuts through carbon budgeting, better technology and 
carbon capture and storage, but also sequestering carbon through 
reforestation. These measures have long-term effects globally. Be-
cause emitted greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for a long 
time (we are currently living with the consequences of emissions 
since the industrial revolution), mitigation must start for full 
now to have an effect for the second half of our century. Because 
of these climate change characteristics, there is a need for legally 
binding, long-term commitments rather than ad hoc measures. 
The commitments in the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC expire 
in 2012, and a committing, long-term framework must be put in 
place. Negotiations on a new protocol started in 2007 and are to 
be concluded by 2009 in Copenhagen. 
Developed countries carry the main responsibility for today’s 
climate change and they have the financial and technological 
resources to deal with it. Driving a car in Texas has consequences 
for a farmer in Bangladesh. The rich, developed countries have 
15 percent of the world’s population, yet still account for almost 
half of the CO2 emissions.63 It is crucial that major developing 
countries, such as China and India, also commit to mitigation, 
but the developed countries must take the lead in these efforts 
and assist developing countries through technology transfers and 
other measures.
Ecological and feminist perspectives on progress
Climate change fundamentally challenges how we think about 
progress and development. Leading ecologists say Gross National 
Product is meaningless as a measure of progress. Measuring all 
goods and services produced in the money economy, it is just 
as much a measure of everything that is going wrong, counting 
money spent on pollution, human casualties, increased waste and 
so on.64 While Stern maintains that all countries can contribute to 
combating climate change while still achieving economic growth, 
Lovelock and deep ecologists advocate for a more fundamental 
shift in attitude and “sustainable retreat.” 
Vandana Shiva claims that western, patriarchal categories of 
development see “destruction as “production””, assuming that it 
takes place only when mediated by technologies for commodity 
production, and “regeneration of life as “passivity””.65 From the 
perspective of Third World women, productivity is a measure of 
producing life and sustenance, she argues. That this kind of pro-
ductivity has been rendered more or less invisible, merely reflects 
the domination of modern economic categories which see only 
profits, not life. 
Global and gender inequalities in adaptation and resilience
Global warming is already a fact. The world average temperature 
has increased 0.7 °C compared to pre-industrial levels. Past emis-
sions of greenhouse gases are estimated to involve some unavoid-
able further warming. By 2100, the IPCC expect that the average 
global temperature will have risen at least by another 1.8 °C. The 
worst-case scenario is a rise in excess of 5 °C. Even the smallest 
rise in average temperature can  have drastic effects. There are 
some impacts for which adaptation is the only available and ap-
propriate response. During the UN Climate Change Conference 
in Bali in December 2007, the developing countries sent a clear 
message that they are already feeling the climate change impacts 
and that adaptation must be a priority alongside mitigation. 
Future generations are not the only ones that will suffer from a 
problem they did not create; the world’s poor suffer from the
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earliest and most damaging impacts.
Adaptation is about finding and implementing ways of adjusting 
to climate change. Local and regional adaptation will be crucial 
in the short to medium-term especially in the more exposed and 
vulnerable countries. Successful adaptation would lessen the need 
to migrate and reduce the risk of conflict. Moreover, there can 
be synergies between adaptation and mitigation: For example, 
not only can reforestation prevent land degradation and floods, 
but it also influences the greenhouse effect by the sequestering of 
carbon.
There is a long record of practices to adapt to the impacts of 
weather as well as natural climate variability. Among proactive 
measures one finds crop and livelihood diversification, famine 
early warning systems, insurance, water storage and supplemen-
tary irrigation. Floods often happen with some likelihood in the 
same areas at the same times. This makes a good case for adapta-
tion through for example flood defence infrastructure. Drought 
and gradual environmental degradation can be prevented and 
adapted to by different land-use techniques and livelihood 
diversification. Examples of reactive adaptations are emergency 
response and disaster recovery. Climate change impacts will 
increase the need for local, national as well as international hu-
manitarian response significantly. Climate change also challenges 
the dichotomy and gaps between relief and development. It can 
strengthen the case for better mainstreaming of disaster risk re-
duction in development planning. Adaptation is integral to both 
humanitarian (relief and rehabilitation) and development work.
The global inequalities in capacities to adapt are glaring. Rich 
countries are already investing heavily in climate change adapta-
tion in their own countries. The UK spends more than a bil-
lion US$ a year on flood defence infrastructure. While there are 
investments in homes that float in the Netherlands, people are 
taught how to float themselves – that is, to swim – in the Mekong 
delta. “Adaptation” in many African countries involves women 
and girls walking longer stretches to collect water and firewood, 
exposing them, some say, to an even greater risk of rapes and 
sexual violence in unstable areas. Clearly, there is a gender dimen-
sion to the climate change impacts and adaptation. According to 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Indian 
women born during a flood in the 1970s were 19 percent less
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Afforestation/ reforestation
Agroforestry
Animal pest control
Appropriate irrigation methods
Aquaculture
Check dams
Cold-resistant housing
Crop processing
Disaster mitigation
Disaster preparedness
Disaster rehabilitation
Drought-resilient crops
Early warning
Exterminating vectors
Flood-resistant housing
Food processing and storage
Forest management
Harvesting of wild foods
Heat-resistant housing
Horticulture
Hydroponics
Improved cropping systems
Indigenous forecasting
Integrated agriculture-aquacul-
ture
Livestock breeding
Ponds
Portable household appliances
Poultry breeding
Promotion of handicrafts
Rangeland management
Restoration of coastal ecosystems
Retaining walls
Saline-tolerant crops
Sea dykes
Seed priming
Seed selection and storage
Soil fertilization
Storm-resistant housing
Tanks
Temporary land redistribution
Vermicomposting
Vocational training
Water allocation
Weed control
Adaptation actions
Source: UNFCCC; http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/adaptation/adapta-
tion_list.pl?id_hazard=&id_impact=&id_strategy=)
likely to have attended primary school.66 Women and children 
make up seven out of ten of the persons affected by famines.67 In 
general, displacement can make people particularly vulnerable to 
climate change impacts. The IDMC global overview report elabo-
rates on the extra risks confronted by internally displaced women 
and children, groups that make up the vast majority of IDPs. In 
sum, the most vulnerable people in the most vulnerable states are 
affected most and have the least capacities to adapt. 
Often the developing countries simply lack the capacity and 
resources to get the information they need. While Africa is par-
ticularly exposed and vulnerable to climate change, the continent 
has the world’s lowest density of meteorological stations. Many 
developing countries also lack the financial resources for infra-
structural adaptation, such as the development of flood
Future floods of refugees
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defences. As part of adaptation to climate change, a system of 
insurance for social protection, such as micro-insurance, is 
also needed. For adaptation strategies to translate into changed 
behavior, institutions or technologies, one must also take into 
consideration the context-specific social, cultural, and psycho-
logical barriers to change.
Adaptation in the most exposed and vulnerable states must be 
an international task for several reasons. One reason is the rich 
countries responsibility for the climate change. The UNFCCC 
contains an appendix constituting a global adaptation fund to 
meet the costs of adaptation to climate change. Article 4.4 of the 
Appendix states that “developed country Parties and other devel-
oped Parties in Annex II shall also assist the developing country 
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse ef-
fects.” Not enough money has been made available for adaptation 
through this and other funds such as the Special Climate Change 
Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund. Up until the end 
of 2007, the total financing through these mechanisms was the 
equivalent to one week’s worth of spending under the UK flood 
defence programme (around 26 million US$).68 The developed 
countries have done far too little with regards to adaptation in the 
developing countries. It is important that new, additional money 
be made available, rather than merely shifting the money from 
development and humanitarian work to climate change adapta-
tion. Resources have to be invested in the whole spectrum of 
measures contributing to adaptation, including disaster manage-
ment, humanitarian response and development work.
Addressing general factors of forced migration and conflict
The IPCC stresses the importance of addressing climate change 
adaptation in vulnerable states, especially where these responses 
are so-called “no regrets” measures – that is, measures that turn 
out to be of benefit no matter how or if the predicted climate 
change impacts. The report notes that most analyses of adapta-
tion propose that successful adaptations involve marginal chang-
es rather than fundamental changes in location and development 
paths. From environmental conflict research and migration and 
refugee studies, it is clear that addressing factors of conflict and 
forced migration can help prevent the worst impacts of climate 
change. Climate change has impacts that may trigger conflicts, 
but they need not rise to the level of violent conflict. The capaci-
ties needed to adapt successfully to climate change are similar 
and often the same as those needed for general development and 
to reduce the risk of conflict and forced migration. Strengthening 
and improving state structures and capacities as well as economic 
and distributive justice are ways of adapting. Thus, conflict- and 
migration-sensitive climate change policies can actively promote 
general development, and climate-proof humanitarian and devel-
opment policies can be effective climate change adaptation. 
Although the responsibility for climate change and its impacts 
primarily lies with the developed countries, the vulnerable states 
are also responsible for addressing general factors of forced 
migration and conflict. Protection of people on its territory is the 
primary responsibility of national states. Adaptation is to a large 
extent a question of resources, information and infrastructure, 
but the role of the state and institutions and other political and 
socio-economic factors are crucial in the prevention of climate 
change impacts, conflict and displacement. 
In our globalised, privatised and free trade world it is increasingly 
difficult to isolate politics in one country and place blame on in-
dividual states alone. Much of the economy of exposed and vul-
nerable states, is often largely controlled by western-owned and 
-based transnational companies. These companies are motivated 
by profit and may even have vested interests in the malfunction-
ing of the states as well as an inherent opposition to adaptation 
and mitigation measures. To illustrate the role of large, transna-
tional companies in root causes of conflict and displacement, one 
can consider the illegal trade in arms. Attempts to control the 
illegal trade in small arms have failed several times because US 
arms manufacturers, referring to market freedom, rejected any 
control of arms.69 They were backed by their government. Obvi-
ously, small arms can play an important role in conflicts and the 
displacement of people. The challenges of developing countries 
must be seen in this larger context. If we want to deal with the 
root causes of forced migration and conflict, we should also seek 
to find them in the policies and practices of developed countries. 
Hopefully, climate change will foster a new and stronger sense 
of solidarity. It provides an opportunity for cooperation in ad-
dressing global issues such as conflict and displacement. Climate 
change reminds us how everything is connected – that humans 
are also part of an overarching whole. The world may be divided
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and people categorised in many ways, but we all share and are 
part of the Earth – at least for now.
• Adaptation measures by reducing the impact of cli-
mate change, can lessen the need to migrate as well as 
reduce the risk of conflict.
• Adaptation in developing countries must be made a top 
priority along with mitigation. Resources have to be 
invested in the whole spectrum of measures contrib-
uting to adaptation, including disaster management, 
humanitarian response and development work.
• Alongside information and infrastructure measures, 
addressing general factors of conflict and forced mi-
gration can also contribute to vulnerability reduction 
and adaptation.
Prevention
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The form and scope of forced migration and conflict
1) Climate change impacts are likely to contribute to an increase in 
forced migration. The climate change and environmental factor is 
one among several root causes of conflict and forced migration.
 
2) The term “climate refugees” and the stipulation of numbers can 
be misleading. It is not possible to isolate climate change as a cause 
of forced migration; the form and scope of migration will depend on 
mitigation, adaptation and other factors; the names and numbers of 
these migrants are coloured by different discourses and agendas; the 
term is legally inaccurate; and many of the displaced are likely to be 
internally displaced. 
3) Climate change is likely to lead to an increase in the frequency 
and severity of sudden disasters such as floods and storms, and an 
increase of physical water scarcity. This can trigger internal and 
regional displacement and environmental conflicts. Sudden disaster 
displacement is typically short-distance and temporary, while 
drought may trigger gradual and longer-distance migration. Migra-
tion can trigger or exacerbate environmental conflicts and vice versa.
4) Since impacts of climate change depend on both exposure and 
vulnerability/resilience, it is likely that developing countries in lower 
latitudes will continue in the near future to be the hotspots in several 
senses of the word. Most forced migration and conflict is expected to 
be internal and regional.
Protection and prevention
1) The forced migrants whose displacement relates to climate 
change impacts, are not automatically excluded by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention definition. The environmental degradation or disaster 
cannot come in as a persecution ground, but it could perhaps be 
considered a form of persecution. 
2) A person fleeing an environmental conflict should be granted the 
same protection status as others fleeing generalised violence.
3) When it comes to the island states that risk becoming submerged, 
there may be a serious protection gap in existing law on statelessness. 
4) In cases of severe environmental degradation and sudden disas-
ters, the human rights principle of non-refoulement could protect 
against return when this must be seen to involve ill-treatment above 
a certain threshold. 
5) Many of the forced migrants will fall in under the definition of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), but their protection will largely 
depend on whether or not the international organisations include 
them in their mandates (operational protection gaps). 
6) Particularly for those considered to have moved due to gradual 
environmental degradation, there may be operational and norma-
tive protection gaps, internally and internationally, because they risk 
being considered economic or voluntary migrants.
7) Adaptation measures, by reducing the impact of climate change, 
can lessen the need to migrate as well as reduce the risk of conflict. 
Recommendations
1) Existing law and protection possibilities should be further inves-
tigated to identify and address potential protection gaps in climate 
change-related displacement. An approach similar to the one taken 
with regard to IDPs, with the creation of the Guiding Principles, 
could be considered. More research is needed. 
2) Many of the forced migrants may be included in already existing 
categories of protected persons, but they may need to be made more 
visible and recognised within the categories. 
3) For the internally displaced persons in general there is still a severe 
protection deficit that must be better addressed. 
4) When it comes to the island states that risk becoming submerged, 
some sort of regulation or agreement on a regional or international 
level should be considered.
5) Adaptation in developing countries must be made a top prior-
ity along with mitigation. There is a need for a broad approach to 
adaptation, and resources have to be invested in the whole spectrum 
of measures contributing to adaptation, including disaster manage-
ment, humanitarian response and development work. 
6) Alongside information and infrastructure measures, addressing 
general factors of conflict and forced migration can also contribute 
to vulnerability reduction and adaptation. 
7) Financial resources must also be made available for countries to 
deal with problems of climate change-related displacement.
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